1: Cohen E-4,5 (1956-1965) 1967 MS14 Kanuri MS14

lage area. The district head sent out his followers who gathered about fifty percent more than the original assessment and the lawan was then chastised and sent back with the warning that he must comply in the future with directives from the district head.

District heads' followers are outside the usual jurisdiction of those lower in the hierarchy such as the lawan. When they must be disciplined, or brought to court, they go directly to the district head or less often to the district judge by-passing the judicial authority of the lawan. Peasants seeking retribution for bad debts, adultery, or some other malfeasance committed by a district head's follower must then take the matter before the district head. This is the test of a district head's justice, and often he forces his followers to repay bad debts or fines, even though he himself is probably the one who will eventually pay the fine by advancing the money to his follower. In one case a district head publicly reprimanded one of his followers, paid his fine, then privately threatened to stop supporting this follower as his client for having burnt down a peasant's hut while drunk when the peasant refused to allow his wife to be molested by the follower. A district head who continually protects his own followers against the peasants develops a reputation as a tyrant and an inefficient administrator. Given the present government it is difficult to hide bad administration since complaints by peasants to touring officials usually provide information to people higher up in the political organization concerning the activities of a district head and his organization.

As suggested above there is sometimes a strain in the relations between a district head and the various lawans who head up the village areas within the district. Formally he relays directives from the capital to them in their village areas and they are supposed to carry out these policies. However the district head needs cooperation, often for necessary but somewhat semi-illicit activities and thus needs people he can trust in leadership positions within the district. On his side the lawan is semi-independent because he is a salaried official. District heads are constantly trying to win the affection and loyalty of their lawans, or if necessary to get them expelled, or wait until they retire and then have the office filled by one of their own loyal followers. Because district heads are constantly being retired, dismissed, or transferred from one district to another, each new district head is confronted with a number of lawans who are the loyal followers of predecessors who were district heads in the area.

The records of turnover of lawans, especially in the district capital where they must see the district head continually, show that in general lawans are dismissed or retired most often shortly after the arrival of a new district head. The case of one lawan in Magumeri illustrates this very common occurrence. From 1921 to 1929 a lawan in Magumeri village area was a follower of the district head of Magumeri District. In 1929 a new district head arrived and suddenly the quality of reports by colonial officials changed. Whereas before this man was reported to be cooperative, intelligent, hard-working, and competent, he was now unpopular with the people, there was much emigration from his village area due to heavy taxation, and he was disrespectful to those in authority. In 1933 he was suspended by the Shehu, and a younger brother of the new district head was appointed to the lawan's office for the Magumeri village area. Examples like this are extremely common in the history of all the districts right up to the present time.

As in the example above there is a tendency for the district heads to ap-

[GEIDAM]

634 692 sented by the Ajia and those under him, are supposed to operate independently and to serve as checks on one another. In Geidam, Yerima Mustapha and Alkali Baba Kura work together very closely. As will be seen, the system of social stratification and the personal histories of the Geidam power elite operate to prevent the independent functioning of the several arms of 178 government. When the social system persists and old Kanuri 648 63 values are adhered to, as happens in Geidam, the traditional political system continues to operate despite new forms instituted by the British colonial rulers.

177 178 625 698 The manner in which this occurs can be seen most clearly in the following example describing the functioning of the police in Geidam. Nigeria has a dual police system: the Nigerian Police, an arm of the Federal Government, and NA Police, part of the Native Authority system. The Bornu NA Police are under a European Assistant Superintendent of Police, stationed in Maiduguri. Among his important concerns is the theft of livestock, particularly in the northernmost districts, since cattle are easily moved across the frontier and sold in Niger, out of [661] the jurisdiction of the Bornu NA Police. The Assistant Superintendent of Police had strong suspicions that collaboration between thieves and political officials on both sides of the border was preventing the apprehension of criminals. He thought that Lowans and Ajias might be hiding and protecting thieves and sharing in their profits. Consequently, he considered it imperative that the Police operate independently of the other

627 is still widely practiced. If a man's decisions are just and people trust him, they will come to him for sholo. If he is not trusted, if he is feared or disliked, people will not bring 627 cases for him to hear. In one situation mentioned, the Lowan 663 of a town hears many cases and receives large amounts in wushira, 661 because he is wise and knows how to deal with people and resolve disputes. The Ajia of that district, who lives in the same town, does very little sholo because he is not tactful, loses his temper, and shouts a good deal. Should people suspect that a Lowan or an Ajia is taking bribes, they will cease to bring their disputes before him. The essence of sholo is that it represents a voluntary action on the part of disputants who wish to have a conflict resolved. The mediator is a person in authority, who is obligated to rule justly by virtue of his position. Should he misuse his position by taking bribes, he would violate the expectations of those beneath him, and they, by ceasing to bring cases to him for sholo, would prevent him from performing one of the most important roles of someone in [431] his position. Giving of kafelo, therefore, is a recognition [539] of the status of the man hearing the case, and is quite different from a bribe.

627 Yerima hears fifteen or twenty cases each week in which 431 he gives sholo. If mediation is impossible, he will send the [671] case to court. To have a case brought before Yerima, the complainant gives several shillings to his wakil. Yerima is never given money directly, but money collected by the wakil is turned

627 431 over to Yerima. Though the wakil or any kabuna may bring a case before Yerima, kafelo is presented solely to the wakil. Yerima denies that he exacts wushira after ruling in a case of sholo, but he admits to receiving kafelo beforehand. He states that kafelo often is in the form of bowls of millet, which he refers to as nasha (gifts); other informants say that kafelo to hear a case must be in hard cash.

627 578 Many of the cases brought before Yerima for sholo involve marital disputes. Where husband and wife are prepared to reconcile their differences, and seek merely to have an authority hear one another's promises not to repeat the things which caused conflict, sholo is effective. Where neither party is prepared to be reconciled, sholo cannot be effective, and the dispute is sent to court. Yerima rarely brings out his Koran for formal swearing. It is usually sufficient for a person to say that he is willing to swear on the Koran--the husband is willing to swear that he will never again beat his wife, the wife in turn is willing to swear that she never again will curse her husband. Sholo is doubly important in Geidam because the Ajia and the Alkali are extremely close, and work effectively together. Yerima sees their cooperation as a virtue. If he is aware of information which the Alkali should know in order to make a proper decision, he informs the Alkali. In turn, it is clear that Yerima's influence with the Alkali can potentially disrupt the course of true justice, might even be used for individual ends by others. Few Ajias are as close with their

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GEIDAM

627 663 661 Alkalis as Yerima is with Alkali Baba Kura, but Yerima would put his influence to use only when affairs arise which directly concern him.

627 829 671 In the eyes of talaka, sholo is the major means for keeping the peace. They do not distinguish sharply between the resolution of conflicts through sholo and through judgments handed down in the courtroom. The Kanuri do not conceive of an impartial legal system which grants all individuals equal protection. Law is conceived of as mediation granted by particular individuals, some more trustworthy than others. Whether one brings one's complaint before the Ajia, the Alkali, or the Lowan depends on whether one has greater trust in the Ajia, the Alkali, or the Lowan. In any case, one brings one's complaint to be heard by a single man, with his particular whims, idiosyncracies and prejudices, and one chooses the man in whom one has the greatest confidence. According to the British view, sholo given by an Ajia or Lowan is not permitted,and is therefore not binding on the parties involved. A man who has received an unfavorable decision in sholo can complain to the court and the decision will be overruled. The Ajia or Lowan who heard the case will have difficulty because of it. This rarely happens because the talaka sees the situation from an entirely different viewpoint. When he brings a case for sholo and receives an adverse ruling, the dispute must end there as he has done everything possible for him to do in the situation, particularly if no bribes have been given (to his knowledge)

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With minor disturbances, including one by the brother of Shehu Umar, in 1854, the Bornu kingdom maintained itself in a fairly stable condition, throughout the reign of Umar, and even afterwards during the reign of his son Bukr (1880-4). However trouble was soon to come from the east.

In the Bahr el Ghazal and Darfur region of the present independent Sudan, an adventurer named Rabeh was slave raiding under the power of the first Egyptian governor of the Bahr, named Zubeyr,(1) in the 70's and early 80's. However Zubeyr's son Stiman headed a rebellion against Egyptian authority and was defeated, and his army disbanded. A remnant of this force headed westward under Rabeh who transformed this band of freebooters and pillagers into a disciplined army which, in the late 80's under the banners of the Mahdi, terrorized the Bahr el Ghazal, conquered Wadai, and defeated the Baghirmi kingdom east of Chad. In 1893, he engaged the Bornu army near Ngala and vanquished it. Whereupon he entered a defeated Bornu and literally raped the countryside. From 1893-6, he despoiled the entire area, putting to death many of the leading figures in Bornu who opposed him, and tried to spread his conquest as far west as possible. In this latter effort he was checked by a union of western forces and refugee Kanuri at the present site of Geidam in northwest Bornu. After 1896 from his capital at Dikwa, Rabeh seems to have attempted a consolidation of the kingdom and due to these efforts at administration a more moderate policy was followed. Nevertheless, his rule is remembered in Bornu today as the blackest period of their history. Old men are still alive who tell of the pillaging, burning, slave-raiding, killing and excessive extortion of the peasants, that was carried on during the "Rabeh period."

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(1) c.f. Balfour-Paul, H.G. History and Antiquities of Darfur; Sudan Antiquities Service, Museum Pamphlet #3 Khartoum, 1955.

175 648 634 632 the new District Head going out to his district was confronted with a situation in which he had a territory comprising a group of villages which were to be under his organised administration, and which were at the same time headed by people with whom he had no personal relationships.

Entering into this situation, the District Head responded in several ways. He could try to win the loyalty of the local Village Heads to himself, or conversely some Village Heads, sensing danger in the new situation, might come to the District Head and ask to be "his man." This meant that the District Head had expanded his following to include the Village Head. However, there were obstacles to this simple method of rapprochement. If the Village Head already had a strong functioning relationship to some other "big man" in the Kanuri state who was a powerful person in the post-1900 organization, or if the District Head was anxious to reward his own supporters with lucrative and prestige giving roles, 175 648 634 632 661 then this method was not too successful. The District Head could also try to manipulate the situation so that the Village Heads who he found the most truculent in accepting his overlordship, were regarded as inefficient, corrupt, or immoral in the eyes of the British, so that they would be deposed and then he could replace them with recruits from among his own following. Thus, in 1919, a British District Officer (D.O.) visiting Magumeri District, was told by Abba Kiari, then District Head of Magumeri, that two of the Village Heads in his District were inefficient and should be deposed. He felt also that because of the proximity of the two towns they should be united under one Village Head, and he offered one of his own followers as the logical candidate for the new appointment.(1) Finally, the District Head could simply carry on as if the British were

(1) Whitely: Report on Magumeri 1919: in Magumeri District Notebook

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648 not present and appoint chima gana to live in each village of the Dis-
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632 trict, who would collect taxes, levy fines, and hold judicial hearings,
661 i.e. act as Village Headmen even though incumbents for these roles had already been appointed by the British. This led to an order by the Resident of Bornu in 1910 to the effect that no District Head could station his men in any of the towns of his District with the exception of his own headquarters. However, the provincial records indicate that the chima problem plagued the administration right up until the 1930's.

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648 Besides the structural difficulties which resulted in the
651 political organization from the colonial contact, a major functional prob-
631 lem emerged in the area of taxation. By 1904 a tax collection system based on assessments made from rough estimates was instituted. Each village was assessed as a whole and the money turned into the Government (at first the Resident, later the Native Authority Treasury) through the District Head of each district. However, the Kanuri pre-British concept of taxation persisted long after British attempts to introduce their own concepts. The British attempted to introduce the idea that the District Head and the Village Heads under him were political functionaries or agents whose task it was to collect taxes, and not levy them as well.

[178] Although well known, this idea has not really ever been transferred from British culture to Kanuri ideas on tax collection and, as we shall see, what amounts to tax levies by local officials in excess of government requirements is almost a universal practice in Bornu today.

[166] The British soon found that "extortion" was being used to collect taxes. Discoveries were made by touring D.O.'s of peasants who would complain of excess taxation, or Village Heads whose prerogatives were being usurped by a chima, or in extreme cases by the emigration of peasants

632 if the matter is ratified by a person of authority in their community. Thus if a man in Magumeri town wishes to move his compound walls in order to expand the size of his dwelling space, he speaks to his ward head about it and they both go to the Lawan and speak to him of the decision. Lawan asks his men to find out if the contiguous neighbours object, and if not, the action is ratified. This supervisory function of political leaders, especially the Lawan, is a well used mechanism for avoiding possible conflicts in the interpersonal relations of people in town and village settlements.

632 651 The Lawan collects two kinds of taxes, although only one is officially recognized by the N.A. Firstly, there is a tax collected for the state from all settled people in the village area which is in the form of a property assessment on all males over the age of eighteen to twenty. Any amount the Lawan obtains with the aid of his organization above the amount written on the tax receipt stubs, is (illegally) [661] his own income. Overtaxing in this manner is a widely accepted prac- [648] tice, but must be kept within limits, since a complaint to the British by a resentful peasant could bring on the dismissal of the Lawan.

632 651 661 The second tax collected by the Lawan is the zakat or tithe on farm produce. Unlike the first tax, there is no official sanction for this levy beyond that of tradition, and the power and authority of [648] the Lawan in his Village Area. Colonial officials assured the writer that this practice was illegal and occurred only sporadically. In a survey of 75 households in three Village Areas (i.e., under three different Lawans) all peasants who had produced a farm crop reported paying a tithe in kind or approximately ten per cent of their millet crop. In twelve cases the household heads declared that they had given ten per cent of all crop production including millet, beans and groundnuts.

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One of the informants offered the information that if he did not pay zakat to his Lawan, his farmland would be taken away from him. Checking this information proved to be difficult, since no cases were ever reported or observed. Consequently, people only speculated about the results of not paying zakat. The belief that land might be confiscated if the zakat tax is not paid is not universal, but the belief that some sort of reprisal would result from non-payment is held by all peasants.

The following excerpt from field notes illustrates the kind of experience that promotes this belief if the Lawan's authority is not responded to with some degree of subordination.

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Bukar is a newcomer to Magumeri. He has been given some land by the Lawan and when not farming plies his trade as a hat maker and mud house builder. Because he had no previous social ties in the town, he has attached himself to the Arabic teacher of the primary school, an N.A. employee and a highly respected religious practitioner. This attachment appears to Bukar because of his strong personal fears of supernatural malevolence. The Arabic teacher gives Bukar a place in the social relations of the town, plus free charms and medicines for illness and bad luck. Bukar looks after the teacher's house, repairs it, cleans it up periodically, and watches it during the latter's absence.

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On one of these occasions of the teacher's absence, Bukar had borrowed some matting from his mentor for use in his own compound. The Lawan, in whose house there was to be a naming ceremony, needed some extra mats for temporary shelters. He sent a follower over to the Arabic teacher's to borrow some of the extra mats that were stocked in the teacher's compound. These were taken, and Bukar was asked what had become of the others. He answered that he had borrowed them and that he was in charge of watching the teacher's possessions during the latter's absence. He refused to produce the matting from his own compound and was brought to the Lawan where his defiance was rewarded by the Lawan telling him that unless he produced the extra matting so that they could be borrowed by Lawan, then he (Bukar) was no better than a common thief. Bukar still refused and the matter was dropped.

When the teacher returned Lawan complained to him of the disobedience and lack of respect of his man Bukar. The teacher said nothing, but instead of reprimanding Bukar, sent him to fetch back the mats borrowed by Lawan (the ceremony was over).

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661 He therefore supported the lower class person against his fellow upper class member.

Several months later Bukar was involved in a case against
632 a Fulani herder whose cows had eaten his millet. The case came
661 before Lawan who ruled that although the Fulani had pulled a
683 knife on Bukar (a serious offence), it was Bukar who had started
684 the fight, and it was this act that had caused the cows to wander over Bukar's field and devour his, as well as another man's, crops. Bukar was then fined heavily for starting a fight, fined for the other man's crops and given an extra fine of five shillings as kafelo for the District Head. (Bukar reports that his crops were already eaten before the fight started; besides this, pulling a knife during a fight is a separate offence to the fight itself, and the Fulani was not fined for this middemeanour).

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661 In discussing the matter, Bukar's senior, the teacher explained that Lawan was angry at Bukar for his behaviour over the mats and was adjudicating against him for this reason. When Bukar finally raised the money for the fine he was told by the teacher to give the money to Lawan and to say that he (Bukar) was a small insignificant poor peasant. He was further instructed to tell Lawan that if there was any help that Lawan needed in house building, he (Bukar) would be pleased to offer his services. The teacher also cautioned Bukar about the future. If Lawan continued to adjudicate against him and give him heavy fines, then he should request to take the case to a higher court. Thus the teacher wished his peasant-follower to make his peace with Lawan, but if this were impossible then higher authorities would be resorted to and Lawan's power by-passed. In other words the teacher felt that the political structure of the town should be respected within limits.

This case illustrates how easy it is for a Lawan to make a reprisal for lack of sensitivity to his power and authority on the part of the peasants under his jurisdiction. His power of granting land use rights, settling disputes, and imposing fines, intersects the lives of his peasants at such vulnerable points that to thwart his power and authority and remain in his territory without the possibility of reprisal would be impossible.

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[643] A Lawan is installed officially by the Shehu at an investiture ceremony in Maiduguri. Even if he inherited the position he must still be "turbaned" by the Shehu to hold office properly. Some village areas claim the same lines of Lawans well back into the 19th century,

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571 Conversation among peasants suddenly stops when one of these fellows
561 approaches the group.

634 The DH's followers are disciplined by the DH rather than
692 the local Lawan. Peasant legal cases usually come before the Lawan for adjudication. But legal cases between peasants and DH's followers are brought to the DH or the District Alkali (Muslim judge) court. The DH disciplines his followers for any high-handed treatment of peasants because such behaviour if continued unchecked can bring action against
[681] him from higher up in the state. Thus the DH Magumeri severely and publicly reprimanded his followers for misdemeanours such as assaulting peasants or not repaying debts. One member of the DH's organization was publicly reprimanded and privately threatened with expulsion from the organization for burning down a pagan's hut because the latter would not give up his wife to the desires of the follower.

634 The followers of DH receive money, food, clothes and status
571 in the society as members of a powerful organization. In return they give him the prestige afforded to anyone who has a large retinue of loyal supporters in a culture where such followings are highly valued.
[557] Informants often remark that one DH was a "bigger" man than another
634 because he had more followers. They also serve as his executive and
571 carry out his decisions in the District. Thus in Magumeri District,
661 where not many of the people are enthusiastic about western education, the DH uses his followers to abduct children from their parents in order to fill the two classrooms of the District's only school. Another DH known to the writer assesses each Lawan for the amount of taxes he must raise annually with the understanding that there will be enough left over after revenue is delivered to the capital for the DH and the Lawan to have some cash gains. In one case a Lawan of the District claimed

634 that his assessment was too high. The DH promptly sent out some of his
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661 followers and gathered twice the assessment originally stipulated. He then called in the Lawan to the District capital, reprimanded him and gave back one-quarter of the excess tax raised by his followers.

631 Formally the Lawans are subordinate to the DH of their District. The DH relays information to them from the capital concerning the execution of their political duties and it is their responsibility to have these directives carried out. However, for various reasons to be discussed presently, some of the political activity of the DH is illegal under the present regulations. Therefore he often requires more than mere compliance to state regulations. As shown by the example above the DH wants cooperation and complicity in his own political organization of the District. Several factors militate against the absorption of the Lawans into the DH's organization. Firstly, the Lawan's salary and his income from taxes and political duties make him less dependent upon the DH than the latter's more disciplined followers. Secondly, the British have always viewed the Lawan's job as that of a local chief (see above pp.36-39) whose ties should be to the locality and not necessarily the DH. Nevertheless a DH's views are almost always taken into consideration by both the NA and the British when a new Lawan
631 is to be appointed. This last point leads to a conflict. Dismissals
661 and transfers are common occurrences among DH's. Because DH's often manage to get a few of their loyal followers into a Lawan's job, especially in the District capital, each new DH in a District is confronted with a few Lawans who are the loyal followers of his predecessor.

The result of this structural framework is a constant manoeuvring by the DH to either win the loyalty and obedience of his Lawans or replace them with his own followers.

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661 Good examples of these conflicts can be seen in some of the recorded history of Magumeri District in the last fifty years. From 1921 to 1929, Lawan Tayil, a follower of the DH, is only mentioned briefly and always alluded to as a competent Lawan. After the DH left the District in 1929 and was replaced by a new one, adverse reports by British officers (who had talked to the new DH) became more and more common. It was noted that Lawan Tayil was unpopular with the people, that there was emigration out of his village area due to exhortative taxation, and that he was disrespectful to those in authority. In 1934 he was deposed and a younger brother of the new DH was installed
631 as Lawan. Examples like this are extremely common from Magumeri's
661 recent past as well as from the other Districts. This is reflected in the length of term of Lawans in office, taken from three widely separated Districts. The average length of tenure for a Lawan who is the follower of reigning Lawan is ten years if the DH remains in the District; on the other hand, the average length of tenure for a Lawan (in the District capital) is four years after a DH has left the District.

There is a tendency indicated in the historical records
631 for DH's to appoint younger brothers as Lawans. But this has its lim-
661 its; sometimes kin are passed over, or relationships are broken because
662 a kin member feels that he will be held responsible for his kinsman's behaviour. Thus in 1935, the Lawan of Magumeri asked the British authorities if he could be moved to another District away from the hegemony of an older brother who was his DH. By 1935 the British had received a great many complaints from Magumeri District about the oppressive taxation of the DH. Thus the DH's younger brother sensing that trouble was brewing for the DH, felt that it would be more advantageous for his own political career if he were out of his older brother's District,

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661 Another good example of this point was observed in the field. The DH of Magumeri, Digma, had obtained a Village Area Headship in Damaturu District for his younger (full) brother in 1944, while he was DH of Damaturu District. His younger brother had been extremely high-handed in the administration of his Village Area and was difficult to bring under control. The brother was finally deposed in 1949, after Digma had been sent to another District and a new DH had taken over Damaturu District. When Digma was made DH of Magumeri in 1952, he made no move to install his younger brother as a Village Area Head (Lawan). He told the writer that it was his intention not to do so in the future because his brother was a "bad man" who oppressed his villagers if he got the chance, and such misdemeanors reflected back on himself as the head of
[602] the District. In the politics of Bornu, the "unity of siblings" is tempered by the requirements of office.

The N. A. Officials in the District

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647 Local representatives of the various branches of the N. A. are stationed in the District Capital. These include (in Magumeri) a District Chief Scribe and his assistants, a veterinary mallam, a hides and skins mallam, an adult education mallam, an agricultural field assistant, the Junior Primary School Headmaster, Arabic teacher, and student teacher, between three and five N. A. Messengers, two to four N. A. policemen, a prison warder, and finally a Muslim Judge (Alkali) for the District court, and his retinue of followers. This list may be expanded or contracted from one District to another, depending upon the number of
[178] civil service branches that are represented in the area. Today the tendency is towards expansion of these services and thus expansion of the personnel stationed out in the "bush." These officials are paid salaries by the N. A. and live in one ward of the District capital (away from the

634 647 Lawan's section), usually near the District Head's ward. They are often shifted from one District to another. Only one of the N. A. employees living in Magumeri in 1956-7 had lived there for more than four years, and almost all of them had lived in at least three towns in the previous ten years. This mobility contributes to their social solidarity. Besides this common experience of mobility, they are for the most part city-bred, or at least city-trained, and form an extension of the urban bureaucracy [571] out in the Districts. Their independent source of income from the civil service, plus their common interests in the city and the state, make them a separate class of cosmopolitans on the rural scene. Thus when asked to name their best friends, these N. A. personnel almost always refer to persons also connected with the N. A.

There is no simple formula to describe the interaction of N. A. officials in the Districts with the DH. In some cases it is similar to the DH/Lawan relationships when the Lawan is a follower of the DH's predecessor in the District. In structural terms this means that the official is not a loyal follower of the DH, but occupies some key position for which 634 the DH needs a disciplined subordinate. This occurs, for example, in the 647 651 office of District Chief Scribe. This official counts the tax revenues, and prepares the balance sheets from the tax receipt books. Since it is important for the DH to control the amount of tax money collected, and to take some for himself to run his organization, he must be in close collaboration with the Chief Scribe.

634 647 661 631 In Magumeri (until August 1957) the District Chief Scribe was a loyal follower of the ex-DH who had gone to another District. All efforts by the present DH of Magumeri to win the support of the Chief Scribe have failed. Other N. A. officials told the writer that the DH

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hinted at the inefficiency of the Chief Scribe to a touring British officer in 1957. After this alleged interview with the DH, the British officer stated that in his opinion there was "something going on here" and he suspected the Chief Scribe, because of a "shifty eyed look about him". In August 1957 the Chief Scribe was formally informed by the N.A. that he was being transferred to another District, with the understanding that the move was a reprimand. The DH is not free to manoeuvre someone more loyal to himself into the position of District Chief Scribe.(1)

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In many cases the relationship between N.A. officials in the District and the DH is one of respectful but carefully maintained social distance. The N.A. personnel are usually new to the District and generally desire to move ahead in their own civil service departments. In Magumeri, these N.A. personnel are asked to appear and eat [565] with the DH between two and four times a week. This helps validate their upper class membership as a group apart from the rural population.

(1) The total politics of this manoeuvre are more complicated than this simple outline indicates. The British officer was accompanied by a high placed N.A. official from Maiduguri in order to reprimand the DH for not collecting enough taxes. (The N.A. official later sent word by messenger from the capital apologizing for his own severity on the grounds that he could do nothing else in the presence of the British officer. He also warned the DH to increase his tax deliveries in order to avoid future trouble). For a show of efficiency, as well as to save the DH from the direct blame, it is believed by the local officials that the Chief Scribe was chosen as a scapegoat. Whether or not this is true is impossible to know; however, it is clear from his own statements that the British officer was strongly of the opinion that the Chief Scribe was in league with the DH to evict the tax revenue, and that the removal of the Scribe would slow down these efforts by the DH. The high placed N.A. official who knew better did nothing to correct this false impression held by the Englishman. And it was this false impression that led to the Chief Scribe's removal from the District. Whether or not the DH and the N.A. official planted the idea in the Englishman's head, or whether they exploited a suspicion already there, still amounts to the same thing - the removal of the Chief Scribe for a "misdemeanour" he did not commit, in order that it might be committed in the future.

634 647 554 owes many obligations to this Shehu's son. Later, through his connections to both these men, and their connections in the Emirate, he was appointed to the job of N. A. Messenger assigned to the DH of Magumeri. The DH arranged that this man be used to deliver the N. A. salaries from [661] Maiduguri to Magumeri. Since the salaries are in cash, the Messenger is able to do some quick trading with the money before he brings it back to [203] the District. Because of his constant trips back and forth to and from the capital, plus his many contacts among the nobles and officials of the State, this Messenger has become the DH's listening post for news and gossip from the city. This communication position is vitally important to the DH since he must know of shifts in policy objectives and personnel in the capital in order to guage properly the pressures that may be exerted upon him from the center. The Messenger fulfilling this role has, in his turn, used his position to usurp a leading status among the followers of the DH, many of whom are either hereditary or long-term members of the DH's organization. They feel that he is "pushy" and confidentially accuse him of secret immorality. On the other hand, his fellow N. A. officials in the District maintain only a polite but distant relationship with him; (a) because of his close ties to the DH, and (b) because he always delivers their salaries late, which naturally antagonizes them. The man thus pays a high price of loneliness and semi-isolation for the key position he has carved for himself in the DH's organization.

634 647 662 The prison warder who kept the little jail in Magumeri, although not formally a DH's follower, was well on the way to becoming

647 661 Discipline in the N.A. reflects the operation of Kanuri values and their instrumentation by European standards. For not being loyal, subservient and profitable as a subordinate in the N.A., a man can be punished by adverse reports which refer to his incompetence, his [183] laziness, his dishonesty, or some particular bungle on his part. The formal reason given for disciplinary action is derived always from the European standards of public service morality, and the real reason generally has to do with superior/subordinate relationships within the N.A. Thus the cause given by local gossip in Bornu for the "purge" of N.A. officials which took place in 1956, all have to do with relations between superiors and subordinates. One explanation deals with the jealousy and rivalry between the Treasurer and the Assistant Treasurer, the other and more widely told story alludes to the difficulties between the Bornu Treasurer and the Wakil (chief follower) of his extended household organization. None of the local rumours attributed the cause of the trials (which led to many jail sentences and dismissals) to the fact of corruption in the civil service. Since British public service morality has been written into law in Nigeria, this method of discipline and pressure, although more easily invoked in the colonial situation, because of the arousable indignation of the local British officers will undoubtedly endure after the country obtains its independence. [671]

Political Parties

665 In contemporary Bornu modern political parties link Bornu to the Northern Region and the Federal Union of Nigeria. Constituted authority, the DH's, Lawans, the judges, the higher officials of the N.A. and all their followers support the N.P.C. (Northern Peoples Congress) which represents similar interests in other provinces of the North. It also forms the majority party in the Nigerian Federal gov-